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Abstract: African extreme poverty is probably a function (although not solely) of the 
balkanized post-colonial geopolitics of Africa. It is also probably a function (although not 
solely) of the income distribution generated by a typically perverse African political 
economy, through its effect on the allocation of resources to development. As between these 
two causes, the second is probably much the more important. This reinterpretation puts 
considerably more of the blame for African poverty on the Western great powers than does 
the “poverty trap” analytic that is a common contemporary way of thinking about the African 
economic situation. 
INTRODUCTION 
This essay, which really is an essay rather than a sustained scholarly 
encounter with the problem, proposes an alternative to the “poverty trap” 
analytic for understanding extreme poverty in sub-Saharan Africa. The 
poverty-trap idea is well instantiated by the following quotation from 
Jeffrey and Lisa Sachs, and it is common among liberal Western 
commentators on African economy. 
For the world’s poorest people, daily life is a struggle for 
survival, with millions of impoverished people each year losing 
that struggle to famine, disease, environmental catastrophes, and 
violent conflicts that arise in conditions of extreme 
deprivation. . . . 
One basic point, not always remembered, is that impoverished 
countries lack their own budgetary resources needed to supply 
vital—indeed life-saving—services such as primary healthcare 
or support for smallholder famers. The poor are thereby trapped. 
The lack of public services leads to hunger, poverty, and 
disease, while the poverty means that the tax base of 
government is too small to support public policies to alleviate 
hunger, poverty and disease. Foreign assistance is then needed 
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to break the vicious circle.1 
My argument has four parts: In the first, I discuss the impact of the 
“balkanization” of sub-Saharan Africa on its economic development. I 
argue that although precise answers are impossible, it seems likely that 
balkanization has been a significant factor in the poor economic 
performance that has relegated about half the population to “extreme 
poverty” sixty years after the Western powers reluctantly acceded to 
African demands for independence from colonial rule. The second part 
of the essay argues that in the great majority of African states, the post-
independence elites, under the strong influence if not outright control of 
the coalition of anti-communist Western great powers, put in place a 
form of political economy that precluded the massive allocation of 
surpluses to development that would have been necessary if Africa was 
to develop in a way that more rapidly reduced extreme poverty. The 
third part suggests that although economic theories of self-sustaining 
economic development are in disarray, the apparent take-off of the 
Chinese, Indian, and Brazilian economies pushes us to look again at the 
“poverty trap” as an explanation of African poverty. The fourth part uses 
two counterfactual hypotheticals to compare balkanization and perverse 
political economy as possible alternative explanations, and suggests that 
as between the two, the second was more important than the first. 
I.  BALKANIZATION AS A CAUSE OF AFRICAN POVERTY 
A.  Definition and Causes of Balkanization 
By “balkanization” I mean to denote the division of Africa into 
dozens of independent states, corresponding to the borders consolidated 
by the colonial powers at the end of the nineteenth century. It is an 
important aspect of this order that the boundaries arbitrarily combined 
and divided major ethnic groupings, and that the newly independent 
countries varied enormously in size, population, natural resources, and 
natural advantages such as access to deep-water ports or navigable 
rivers. The combination of resources, population, and access features for 
any given state was largely random. 
There is no single answer to the question of why balkanization 
occurred. But a key factor to consider is that the colonizing states, allied 
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Perelman eds., 2011); see also Jeffrey D. Sachs et al., Ending Africa’s Poverty Trap, 2004 
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with the United States and with local African elites, chose to exercise 
their sovereign legal powers under public international law to configure 
independent Africa as the Balkans. The post-colonial regime of public 
international law explicitly declares the continuing legitimacy of the 
boundaries set at independence. 
With very few exceptions, the French have maintained a significant 
military presence across their ex-empire, supporting dictatorial regimes 
under an implicit deal that discourages wars of expansion, but provides 
defense against aggression by their neighbors (often ex-British colonies), 
in return for continued French economic dominance. The ex-British 
colonies have had considerably more autonomy, but their dependence on 
Western aid and expertise has militated against “adventures.” 
The very fragility generated by the random boundaries and internal 
heterogeneity of the balkanized states suggested to African leaders that 
wars of expansion might well “open Pandora’s box,” or “upset the 
applecart,” with highly unpredictable results. In their sub-continental 
institutions they have repeatedly affirmed the importance of respecting 
the boundaries, however open to critique they may be as colonial 
impositions. 
Of course, Africa was hardly unified before it was colonized, and the 
colonial powers did not set out to fragment it—that was just the 
unintended consequence of their relentless pursuit of their understanding 
of their own interests. 
B. Consequences of Balkanization 
Balkanization seems likely to have been important on many different 
levels. First, in the period between independence and 1980, orthodox 
development theory, whether communist, socialist, liberal or merely 
nationalist, called for import substitution industrialization (ISI), with 
accompanying infrastructure requirements. Across the Global South 
(e.g., India, Brazil, Egypt, and Indonesia), the state was supposed to take 
a very active if not a completely dominant role in executing this strategy. 
The rationale was that underdeveloped markets, co-existing with 
subsistence production in an only partially commodified economy with a 
limited entrepreneurial class, under-rewarded the investment that would 
have been necessary to spark privately driven development. 
The ISI strategy aimed to counter the tendency towards stagnation 
through a host of policies, including: tariff protection for infant 
industries; quantitative restrictions on imports; manipulation of 
exchange rates and various kinds of control of capital movements with 
the same objective; marketing-board monopsonies permitting the 
taxation of agricultural exports to finance the new industries; 
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development banking intended to make capital available to new 
enterprises at below market rates; the large-scale state provision of 
public utilities; the creation of mixed public–private or “parastatal” 
enterprises; and from time to time the regulation of prices, particularly 
food prices and wages in the “modern” sector.2 (The Asian Tigers 
alternative, pursuing both ISI and export promotion right from the 
beginning, also required a dominant state role, although this aspect of 
their strategy has been underplayed in the neoliberal account.3) 
Balkanization meant that the size of the internal market in most of the 
four dozen sub-Saharan African states was much too small to permit the 
economies of scale necessary to make industrial production competitive 
with imports, even with heavy tariff protection. And even in the larger 
countries, it was impracticable to undertake more than a small sample of 
industrial projects. (Of course, a continental free trade zone could have 
cured that, but it is hardly surprising in retrospect that none was destined 
to emerge.) 
Balkanization occurred at the end of a colonial order that had invested 
very little in training native cadres with the capacity to manage a state, 
let alone to manage a developmental state pursuing ISI. The duplication 
of state structures meant that there were dozens of central banks and 
dozens of finance ministries and dozens of development planning 
agencies, but in 1960 I doubt that there were fifty African PhDs in 
economics in all of sub-Saharan Africa. (Of course, foreign experts were 
available if the price and living conditions were right, but it is hardly 
surprising in retrospect that they were more often flying in and out as 
very short-term consultants or negotiating from the side of Western 
commercial interests than serving permanently or negotiating from the 
African side.) 
From the point of view of state-initiated development, material 
resources located in one state might have been profitably combined with 
populations and locations in other states, but balkanization made such 
combinations subject to prohibitive transaction costs. Balkanization also 
meant that the surpluses available for taxation or other modes of 
appropriation were dispersed across jurisdictions, and so could not be 
aggregated and redeployed according to a large-scale plan. 
An interesting categorization of African states as “landlocked, 
                                                     
2. The intellectual and political genealogy of ISI is complex and interesting. For a first attempt to 
situate it in its global context, see Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations of Law and Legal 
Thought: 1850–2000, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 19 
(David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006). 
3. See generally ALICE H. AMSDEN, THE RISE OF “THE REST” (2001). 
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resource-scarce,” “coastal, resource-scarce,” and “resource-rich,” 
suggests that each faces specific challenges and opportunities.4 This kind 
of analytic is useful, but it is important, it seems to me, that it 
presupposes the balkanized order of states: combining landlocked and 
coastal resource-poor states with resource-rich ones would eliminate 
most of the “challenges,” while multiplying the opportunities. Even the 
“Dutch disease” challenge to the resource rich states, i.e., the tendency 
to replace development policy with struggles over the distribution of the 
rents from the resource, would look different if the riches characterized a 
region of a country with only moderate overall resource endowment, 
rather than dominating a small national scene. 
I think we can blame balkanization as a factor (no more than a factor, 
yet still worth assessing) in the political instability of the region, with 
accompanying tendencies of groups with access to state power to act in 
brutally self-interested and exploitative ways, as indicated by the figures 
for deaths from war and famine cited below. I don’t think there’s much 
disagreement that these tendencies have been destructive of the chances 
for development across the sub-continent (not least by discouraging, not 
just foreign investment, but investment of all kinds).5 
The links between balkanization and instability are of course 
speculative, but still plausible to my eye. Small African states are 
vulnerable to influence by much larger developed states (obviously 
including the ex-colonial power, supposing it is a “great power”), and 
their whole economies are much smaller in straight dollar terms than the 
balance sheets of the financial, commercial, and industrial multinationals 
on which they are dependent in many different ways. The rewards of 
alliance with these rich actors (and the punishments for defying them) 
may have often seemed more plausibly available than those that might 
have been derived from even a successful economic nationalism. Within 
small states, polarized ethnic or religious divisions can lead to winner-
take-all situations, and the anticipation that power is likely to shift 
decisively can make it seem rational for temporary winners to indeed 
take all while the taking is good. 
Of course, none of this is at all decisive. The multiplicity of African 
states might conceivably have functioned as so many “laboratories of 
                                                     
4. 1 THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ECONOMIC GROWTH IN AFRICA, 1960–2000, 3–75 (Benno J. 
Ndulu et al. eds., 2008); see also John Luke Gallup, Jeffrey D. Sachs & Andrew D. Mellinger, 
Geography and Economic Development, in ANNUAL WORLD BANK CONFERENCE ON 
DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 1998, at 127 (Boris Pleskovic & Joseph E. Stiglitz eds., 1999). 
5. See generally ROBERT H. BATES, WHEN THINGS FELL APART: STATE FAILURE IN LATE-
CENTURY AFRICA (2008). 
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democracy,” to borrow Justice Louis Brandeis’s famous hopeful phrase 
for describing the states in the American federal union, or in this case as 
“laboratories of development policy,” analogous to the Asian congeries 
of Singapore, Hong Kong, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand. Two 
(out of the three dozen or so) very small African states—Botswana 
(neighboring South Africa) and the island nation of Mauritius—have 
managed rapid economic growth with poverty reduction, so small size is 
obviously not categorically fatal. And the largest African states, both in 
terms of area and population—Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Ethiopia, and Sudan—have not managed to turn size into 
development. 
It is nonetheless hard to see the fragmentation of Africa as neutral 
from the point of view of development. If it seems more likely than not, 
in spite of the uncertainties, that balkanization reduced and continues to 
reduce the possibilities for effective development policy across sub-
Saharan Africa, then it seems fair to place some of the blame for extreme 
poverty on balkanization. Indeed, given the obstacles, it is striking that 
in the ISI period, up to 1980, sub-Saharan Africa registered significant 
growth in per capita income, although nothing like a take-off into self-
sustaining growth occurred. 
Recognizing balkanization as a factor does not negate the existence of 
a poverty trap for today’s African states. The trap may be a crucial fact 
about that world, precisely because it is a balkanized world. Given 
balkanization, the existence of a trap provides a strong argument for 
increasing Western aid. But it is important to remember that the trap is 
not a “natural” or inevitable aspect of the post-colonial situation, but 
rather the product of a particular sequence of events, unfolding within a 
particular normative order, enforced through a combination of global 
law and power politics. 
The next section proposes a similar critique of the trap idea from the 
point of view of political economy. 
II.  A PERVERSE POLITICAL ECONOMY STIFLES 
DEVELOPMENT 
In critical legal studies, we devoted a good deal of attention to ways 
in which legal rules, justified on the ground that they lead to efficient 
resource allocation, may produce distributive outcomes so unjust as to 
make the efficiency advantages seem unimportant or even perverse.6 
                                                     
6. Summarized in Duncan Kennedy, Law and Economics from the Perspective of Critical Legal 
Studies, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 465 (Peter Newman 
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(We also emphasized the likelihood of multiple efficient equilibria with 
sharply different distributive outcomes, and the bogus quality of many 
arguments for the efficiency of particular rich-friendly rules.7) In this 
section, I am going to pursue a reverse kind of argument, along the lines 
that: the distributional outcome produced by a given institutional order 
(legally enforced) can preclude the investment needed if there is to be 
economic development that reduces poverty. Of course, it is 
questionable whether we know enough about what causes poverty-
reducing growth to be able to evaluate the effects of any particular 
economic regime, and I will address this well-justified skepticism in the 
next part of the essay. 
A key idea here is that across the sub-continent, and North Africa and 
the Middle East as well, the post-independence configuration produced a 
particular political economy, obviously not everywhere identical, but 
with many common features.8 
In African countries at the time of independence, and still today, there 
has been both very significant foreign ownership, direct and indirect, of 
what exists in the way of commercial, agricultural, mining, and 
industrial assets, and significant foreign debt owed to private, 
governmental and international financial institutional (IFI) creditors. In 
every African country there are more-or-less Westernized dominant 
groups or classes. The local elites are partly pre-colonial and partly post-
colonial. They use some combination of “traditional” tribal authority, 
private ownership under a Western legal regime, political party 
organization, control of the military and police, access to international 
(Western, once Russian, now also Chinese) aid and investment, and 
control of the distribution of state revenues from taxation and ownership 
of natural resources to preserve their position vis-à-vis the rest of the 
population.9 
The poor in Africa have been, since the 1920s, more and more 
thoroughly economically integrated both with the foreign economic 
forces and with the economically dominant domestic groups. The self-
sufficient village subsistence economy has been gone for several 
generations. Because of their weak bargaining power vis-à-vis all of 
these actors, their incomes are so small as to preclude significant saving 
                                                     
ed., 1998). 
7. Id. at 469–70. 
8. For an example of how this pattern played out in Egypt, see Lama Abu-Odeh, On Law and the 
Transition to Market: The Case of Egypt, 23 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 351 (2009). 
9. See generally MAHMOUD MAMDANI, CITIZEN AND SUBJECT: CONTEMPORARY AFRICA AND 
THE LEGACY OF LATE COLONIALISM 3–27 (1996). 
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for investment in development on their own behalf. They are also far too 
weak politically to force the elites to invest with their interests 
specifically in mind. 
At the same time, the different groups that appropriate most of the 
surplus the economy generates have very limited incentive to invest their 
part in the kinds of enterprise that could over time generate poverty-
reducing development. Investments likely to redound to the long-run 
benefit of the poor comprise a minuscule part of the total value 
generated in the economies of which the poor are a part and on which 
they are completely dependent. 
In other words, the extremely poor do not have the resources but 
those who do have other things to do with their money. First, there is the 
collection of interest by foreign creditors and the repatriation of profits 
from foreign owned enterprises, whether in manufacturing or in resource 
extraction, often operating according to the World Bank 
recommendation that resource rich countries grant ultra-favorable 
concessions to the multinationals to induce their investment. Second, 
governments, money-lenders, and international trading companies 
appropriate a big share of the surplus from agricultural exports (the 
famous “exploitation of the countryside”).10 
Third, elites appropriate a large share of the surplus from extractive 
industries, after the foreign share. Fourth, governments allocate a 
significant share of surplus to buying the support of people in the 
gigantic cities, mainly along the coast, refugees from deteriorating 
agricultural life in the “interiors,” surviving with food subsidies in the 
urban informal economy and/or on government jobs that are nominally 
white collar (rather than jobs in industry or extraction). 
The way this works has changed over time. In the phase of import 
substitution industrialization (roughly, for any given state, from 
independence up to 1980), national elites controlled the new, often 
parastatal banks and industries, or worked for foreign multinationals that 
did that job. In the absence of pre-War manufacturing experience 
(except in South Africa), there was no basis for the enrichment of an 
established entrepreneurial bourgeoisie, and it turned out that the size of 
the internal market was in most cases much too small (balkanization) to 
permit the economies of scale that would have been necessary for local 
industries to sustain themselves without large subsidies continued 
indefinitely. 
                                                     
10. For a concise summary, see BATES, supra note 5, at 58–62. See generally ROBERT H. BATES, 
MARKETS AND STATES IN TROPICAL AFRICA: THE POLITICAL BASIS OF AGRICULTURAL POLICIES 
(Brian Barry & Samuel L. Popkin eds., 1981). 
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The surpluses generated by ISI went to many different subcategories 
of the population strategically placed as rent-seekers, ranging from 
recipients and corrupt issuers of import licenses, to unionized workers in 
the formal sector, to the directors and managers of the many kinds of 
mixed public/private enterprise, to civil servants, to politicians who 
siphoned off large chunks of aid money. Domestic elites were 
appropriators rather than entrepreneurs. 
After 1980, this regime underwent quite drastic change. The elections 
of Reagan, Thatcher, and Kohl, the consequent change in leadership of 
the IFIs, and the effects of devaluation and general global south financial 
crisis ushered in the new world of the Washington Consensus. The 
Consensus was in favor of dismantling the ISI institutions through 
deregulation and privatization, and opening the third-world economies to 
the global commodity and capital markets. The idea was in essence to 
shrink the role of the state, with the idea that its place would be more or 
less automatically taken by “the market.”11 
The decline or demise of much of the subsidized industry, the 
privatization of public services and the turn to export-led growth in an 
economy opened to imports brought new forces into existence. But it 
was a serious error, both of theory and of observation, to think that 
“getting prices right” would eliminate or even diminish “rent-seeking.” 
Instead the sources of rents shifted from regulatory restrictions to 
privately generated rents in uncompetitive markets characterized by all 
kinds of informational and power asymmetries. Having “the” cell phone 
franchise might be worth more than access to import licenses ever was. 
In both phases, the surpluses not recycled to secure the support of the 
urban masses were either repatriated by foreign creditors and 
multinationals, invested abroad by members of the local dominant class, 
spent on the employment of service workers and servants, spent on 
imported consumption goods like automobiles, or invested locally in 
activities unlikely to increase productivity (for example, luxury housing 
construction). 
Of course, in the neoliberal fantasy of perfect capital markets, none of 
this would make any difference. The neoliberal argument is that the 
surplus extracted becomes part of the supply side of a now globalized 
capital market. The flow of capital from that supply depends on the 
                                                     
11. An important document in the African version of this turn was the Berg Report, published as 
THE WORLD BANK, ACCELERATED DEVELOPMENT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: AN AGENDA FOR 
ACTION (1981). It was a very odd idea that deregulated economies would default to “the market,” 
because there was no defined institution of this kind covering more than a small part of the economy 
in any African state other than South Africa. 
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decisions of the managers of foreign multinationals about what to do 
with repatriated profits, the decisions of creditor financial institutions 
about what to do with interest and amortization paid by African 
countries on private and public debt, the investment decisions of banks 
receiving deposits from them, and from the African appropriators of 
economic surplus (whether honestly or corruptly obtained). 
If there are opportunities for investment in growth-producing 
activities, then the managers of global capital should be able to spot 
them (indeed, according to the fantasy, much more able than even the 
rare well-intentioned government). In short, the expatriated savings 
generated by economic activity in Africa should be recycled right back 
to Africa to the extent it makes “economic sense” to invest them there. 
I doubt that many of my readers will find the neoliberal fantasy 
plausible. It seems much more likely, at least to me, that the political 
economy I have been describing has directed only a small proportion of 
domestically generated surplus into development-inducing investments 
that would have “made economic sense” from the point of view of the 
African poor. But it might be useful to explain this skepticism in a little 
detail. 
First, the quantity of savings that becomes part of the global supply of 
capital is, in this scenario, the result of the various extractive strategies 
of the various strong actors (creditors, multi-nationals, elites, etc.). The 
size of the surplus is arbitrary from the point of view of development 
policy, i.e., unrelated to the quantities that it would make “economic 
sense” for a developmental state to force as savings and then invest. 
Second, the surplus extracted will be allocated by the managers of 
global capital according to their assessment of economic return. These 
managers operate under conditions of imperfect information, different 
risk preference for different investor classes, and different time horizons 
for assessing future returns. They have no legal, and in their own view, 
no moral obligation to channel African surplus back to Africa. The post-
colonial balkanization of Africa means not only that internal markets are 
usually small, but also that political risk is often severe. African 
investment opportunities compete for global capital against the 
opportunities in every other capital importing country. 
Even if we assume highly rational investment decisions, there is no 
reason to believe a priori that they direct back to Africa any significant 
proportion of the surplus extracted. It may well have been the case, if we 
suppose a well-functioning global capital market, that African surplus 
has financed development in other parts of the world, indeed everywhere 
but in Africa itself. In a world system characterized by circular causation 
and extreme path-dependency, this kind of pattern may well have 
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reinforced African disadvantage over time.12 From a Kaldor–Hicks 
economic efficiency point of view, this is a preferred outcome, so long 
as the return on investment of African surplus in non-African markets is 
higher than African return. 
The analogy here is to the investment of the savings of the African-
American inhabitants of U.S. urban ghettos, collected by the ghetto 
branches of national banks, in projects located everywhere but in the 
ghetto.13 This phenomenon led in the 1970s to the Community 
Reinvestment Act, which made at least a gesture toward requiring some 
reinvestment of savings in the low-income communities that generated 
them.14 
Let’s imagine counterfactually that reinvestment of African surplus in 
Africa is somehow required. The comparative claim—that the market 
allocations that have actually occurred over the last fifty years have been 
better than the alternatives—is based on a conservative critique of a 
progressive argument in favor of state-led development. The progressive 
argument was that what makes “economic sense” from the point of view 
of the private return to investment may—or most decidedly may not—
correspond to what makes “economic sense” from the point of view of 
poverty-reducing economic growth. This is just a variant of the old, old 
argument of Pigou: private return may diverge dramatically from social 
return.15 In this case, private return to growth-neutral or even growth-
impeding investments may be larger than the return to socially 
productive investments. Within the growth-neutral category, poverty-
reducing growth may be less profitable than poverty-exacerbating 
growth. 
In the context of African development, the argument has been that the 
social return to investment in local health, education, infrastructure, the 
mechanization of agriculture and, yes, import-substituting or export-
generating industrial enterprise (for example, fostering “national 
champions”) was and is much higher than the private return. The 
neoliberal response has been that private actors going for private return 
are actually more likely to induce growth than state actors attempting the 
                                                     
12. The classic study of this type of phenomenon remains GUNNAR MYRDAL, THE DRIFT 
TOWARD REGIONAL INEQUALITY IN A COUNTRY, in ECONOMIC THEORY AND UNDERDEVELOPED 
REGIONS (1957). 
13. See DANIEL R. FUSFELD & TIMOTHY BATES, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE URBAN 
GHETTO 225–31 (1984). 
14. For an introduction to this topic, see generally A. Brooke Overby, The Community 
Reinvestment Act Reconsidered, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1431 (1994–1995). 
15. See A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (1920). 
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impossible tasks of identifying “true” social return (“picking winners”) 
and often without any loyalty to the task of pursuing it even if they could 
identify it.16 Their argument is that African leaders should, if anything, 
have tied themselves earlier and more firmly to the mast of the good ship 
Market, rather than trying to steer their own course. 
My argument has been that post-colonial balkanization combined 
with the specific institutional and policy arrangements, put in place first 
by socially oriented and then by neoliberal, globally-incentivized 
regimes, are the cause of African poverty. This combination led to 
governments that had neither the will nor the ability to plan and then 
effectively allocate for development in the directions and on the scale 
necessary to initiate poverty-reducing growth. 
III.  CHINA AND INDIA SHOW THAT TAKE-OFF IS POSSIBLE 
BUT WE DON’T KNOW WHY IT HAPPENS 
The argument of the last Part depends, of course, on the plausibility of 
the counterfactual claim that some conceivable geo-political and 
political economic alternative might have done much better. In Part IV, I 
take up this kind of counterfactual argument, hoping that it will also be 
useful in comparing the effects of balkanization and policy failure. 
Before pursuing this thought experiment, it seems necessary to deal with 
the objection that, in its current state, development economics offers us 
no hope either of explaining African poverty, or of assessing 
counterfactual alternatives. 
A.  The Weakness of Development Theory17 
The initial approach of Western non-communist development 
economists was based explicitly or implicitly on the idea that proper 
policies could trigger “take-off into self-sustaining growth,” thought to 
lead more or less automatically, after an initial phase of growing 
inequality, to poverty-reduction on the model of what happened in the 
developed North Atlantic countries. The proper policies were explicitly 
                                                     
16. One—but not the only—virtue that neoliberals have claimed for private market allocation of 
investment has been put in technical economic terms: private capital markets are efficient, or at least 
reasonably efficient, compared to other allocative mechanisms. The major problems here are: first, 
that capital markets are notoriously inefficient and “second best problems” are rampant; and second, 
that the efficiency falsely claimed for them is in any case merely static. There is no reason to think 
that Kaldor–Hicks efficient outcomes correspond in any ways to growth-inducing outcomes. 
17. For useful treatments of the issues raised in this section, see generally JAMES M. CYPHER & 
JAMES L. DIETZ, THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (3d ed. 2008). 
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non- or anti-communist, but also initially quite interventionist, by 
contrast with the neoliberal phase that began around 1980. 
If we had a strong theory of what causes take-off into self-sustaining 
growth, we could assert with more confidence what the consequences of 
balkanization and “perverse political economy” have been for poverty in 
Africa. But theories of development have undergone what strikes me, as 
a person who was first interested in the topic as an undergraduate 
economics major in 1961, as a continuous and unrelenting fifty-year 
process of invalidation. 
This list of phrases is meant to evoke the proliferation of descriptive 
and prescriptive categories for understanding and inducing development: 
capital/output ratio, balanced growth, big push, take-off, unbalanced 
growth, ISI, size of the internal market, savings rate, unlimited supply of 
labor, infrastructure, electrification, irrigation, green revolution, human 
capital, community development, export-led growth, poverty reduction, 
rent-seeking, getting prices right, comparative advantage, foreign direct 
investment, rule of law, property rights formalization, developmental 
state, embedded autonomy, new institutionalism, national champions, 
new developmental state, Washington Consensus, post-Washington 
Consensus, . . . with the upshot being something like: the expert intones 
that “my expert opinion is that there is no one size that fits all,” which 
turns out to mean no theory at all. 
The economies of Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa grew 
substantially between 1945 and 1980, but they did not take-off into self-
sustaining growth. Their failure to close the gap with the developed 
Western and communist economies, and then their disarray in the face of 
the oil shocks and world financial crises of the late 1970s and early 
1980s, set the stage for the takeover of neoliberal “free market” theories, 
enforced by the international financial institutions and national aid 
agencies. The even more disappointing results of the neoliberal turn for 
Latin America, the Middle East and Africa after 1980, have led to the 
reconfigurations of development policy discourse in our time. 
The first new formula was “basic needs,” then “poverty reduction,” as 
opposed to “growth,” succeeded in interesting ways by “human 
development” or “development as freedom,” and then “extreme poverty 
reduction” (as against growth in GDP per capita), and economic and 
social rights, or “development as rights,” in place of statistical 
aggregates. 
The good thing about each of these formulae is that they have a 
distinct “distributive” focus. As opposed to GDP per capita, they state 
their goal in terms of impacts on the people at the bottom of the heap, 
rather than on national aggregates. The virtually exclusive attention to 
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aggregates had had the effect of validating development strategies that 
dramatically enrich the top while impoverishing or just neglecting 
everyone else. Another good thing about them is that they go beyond 
monetary measurement, explicitly defining development in concrete 
terms of health, education, life expectancy, and so forth. 
The down side of the new categories, to my mind, is that they 
deliberately remove the focus from the idea of a governmental project to 
dramatically increase productivity and initiate take-off. As Amsden has 
noted,18 their focus is instead on welfare, on conditions of life, rather 
than on production seen as something to be strategized about from a 
national center. The notable exceptions are the rise of micro-lending and 
of the “titling” idea. The promise of each of these is that a micro-
reconfiguration of currently distorted incentives could, by increasing 
poor people’s access to capital, dramatically increase economic activity 
(however implausible this may seem). 
This is consistent with the neoliberal Washington Consensus idea that 
once developing countries got rid of their failed state enterprises and 
subsidies, their welfare and regulatory regimes, and impediments to 
foreign trade and capital mobility, prices “gotten right” would be enough 
not just to increase static Kaldor–Hicks efficiency but to take care of 
long term development as well. It is interesting that poverty reduction, 
human development, and economic and social rights, as goals or values, 
are quite well-suited to this neoliberal policy framework, not because of 
what they ask for but because of what they do not ask for, namely a 
developmental state driving for take-off. 
The appeal of these ideas was fed, toward the end of the period of 
import substitution industrialization, by something more than just 
disappointment (except for the East Asian Tigers), with state-led 
development. Another factor was that the states that failed to deliver 
take-off did deliver massive human rights abuses along with 
dictatorships and wars. If there was an upside to the loss of confidence 
that take-off was around the corner, it was that after 1980 it was hard to 
argue that these unpleasantnesses were the price of dramatic economic 
transformation, because that had not occurred. 
B.  Take-Off Is Back 
The shift in the emphasis of development theory from the grandiose 
to the pragmatic, eclectic, and welfare-oriented, has been once again 
                                                     
18. Alice Amsden, Say’s Law, Poverty Persistence, and Employment Neglect, 11 J. HUMAN 
DEVELOPMENT & CAPABILITIES 57 (2010). 
10 - WLR March 2012 - Kennedy.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/15/2012  12:10 PM 
2012] AFRICAN POVERTY 219 
 
destabilized, this time by the more or less simultaneous apparent take-off 
of the Chinese, Indian, and Brazilian economies. It is obvious that they 
are reducing poverty on a scale and at a speed that dwarfs and 
marginalizes not just the “accomplishments” of the Washington 
Consensus, but also the modest progressivism of the post-Consensus 
Millennium Development Goals project. It seems to have turned out that 
take-off is possible after all. 
Possible, but no more comprehensible than it was in the 1960s heyday 
of the Rostow theory,19 whose emptiness was well critiqued and put in 
institutional context by Gunnar Myrdal in The Asian Drama, published 
in 1968.20 China, India, and Brazil, from the point of view of the older 
theories, have surprisingly little in common as models. It seems that very 
different institutional orders can each generate a high savings rate, with 
the savings channeled consistently over time into the hands of economic 
actors who will invest, and then reinvest, in ways that lead to a dramatic 
shift from low-efficiency agricultural production to much more 
productive industrial, agricultural and extractive pursuits. 
In each case there was a sustained period of state-led development 
followed by a dramatic, but also highly regulated, turn to the market. 
(None of these states did anything like what the IFI’s were demanding 
and getting from the more or less bankrupt African states.) Foreign 
direct investment (FDI) played anywhere from a small to a large role 
depending on the case. There are many possible ways to fit these facts 
together into a theory: crediting or condemning the state-led phase, 
crediting or condemning the role of FDI, crediting or condemning the 
post-liberalization management of the economy, and so forth. 
Investment is obviously not the only driver of growth, and it is even 
possible to imagine scenarios in which a “take-off” is provoked not by 
new investment but by a dramatic increase in the efficiency of existing 
capital occurring without significant changes in savings/investment 
quantities and practices. Nonetheless, the intuition that balkanization and 
“perverse political economy” are causes of African poverty is based on 
the idea that they made it impossible, or at least unlikely, that there 
would be the mobilization and direction of savings in an initial phase 
laying the foundation for later growth. Likewise, that they precluded the 
aggressive management of the post-liberalization market so as to sustain 
not just savings, but the investment and reinvestment of savings in high-
                                                     
19. See W.W. ROSTOW, THE STAGES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH: A NON-COMMUNIST MANIFESTO 
(1960). 
20. 3 GUNNAR MYRDAL, ASIAN DRAMA: AN INQUIRY INTO THE POVERTY OF NATIONS 1850–55 
(1968). 
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productivity activities, drawing labor out of agriculture.21 
The idea that the mobilization and direction of resources for 
investment is the key to development is shared by the poverty-trap 
analytic, and explains the centrality of foreign aid within it. Jeffrey and 
Lisa Sachs, in the short introductory piece I quoted above, put it this 
way, focusing not on the Millennium Development Goals but on the 
denial of economic and social rights (ESR): 
[A]dequate financing is needed to alleviate the poverty-related 
burdens of weak governance, inadequate infrastructure, 
excessive population growth, poor health, low literacy, and 
resource depletion, which all contribute to extensive ESR 
violations. Yet economic development is precluded by precisely 
these poverty-related burdens, which decrease productivity, 
earning ability, and economic investments. The implication of 
poverty traps is that poor countries, on their own, are often 
unable to honor their basic economic and social rights 
obligations. Realizing these human rights requires increased 
public outlays and infrastructure that are beyond the financial 
means of poor countries. This is not to remove the responsibility 
of the home governments of low-income countries, but it is to 
emphasize that ESR is often a partnership affair—achievable 
through the joint efforts of rich and poor countries alike.22 
My argument above was that while the Sachs are right to focus on 
investment, the cause of the poverty-trap is not, as they suggest, the 
poverty of countries in which the poor live, combined with the failure of 
the developed core countries to provide adequate aid, but that the poor 
are embedded in national and international political economies that 
predictably direct economic surpluses away from local reinvestment that 
might improve their situation through development. The next Part tests 
the plausibility of this argument through two counterfactual thought 
experiments. 
IV.  COMPARING BALKANIZATION WITH POLICY FAILURE 
AS CAUSES OF AFRICAN POVERTY 
Is it at all plausible that either balkanization or “perverse political 
economy” is a cause of African poverty? If it is plausible, how much is 
due to the balkanized situation, and how much to the sequence of 
relatively ineffectual ISI followed by an equally ineffectual turn to 
                                                     
21. For a defense of this theory of “take off,” see CYPHER & DIETZ, supra note 17, at 308–40. 
22. Sachs & Sachs, supra note 1, at xvi. 
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markets? With these questions in mind, I suggest two counterfactual 
thought experiments that are supposed to test, in a very loose and 
imprecise way, the plausibility of attributing African poverty to the 
combination of balkanization and perverse political economy. 
The first counterfactual imagines the same stages of political 
economy that occurred in post-independence sub-Saharan Africa, but 
managed by a sub-continental federal mega-state. The point is the 
contrast with the actual balkanized and unstable context. The second 
counterfactual imagines that a unitary sub-continental mega-state has 
been governed since its origin by a revolutionary communist party 
emulating the Chinese model of development through its post-Cultural 
Revolution stages. The first thought experiment suggests that a sub-
continental state pursuing the policies followed in real life in a 
balkanized context would have done only a little better than the 
balkanized states did in fact. The second suggests that a revolutionary 
continental state might have done much better. It would seem to follow, 
in the roughest possible way, that while balkanization counts, policy 
counts more. 
A.  ISI and Liberalization in a Sub-Continental Federal State 
Let us suppose that the newly independent African countries had 
managed early on to form a single federal state, and that this state had 
managed to maintain a much higher level of internal political stability 
than has the balkanized continent. The main terms of federal union, let 
us imagine, have to do with the economy. There is a customs union, and 
rights of free movement of goods, workers, and capital within the 
federation. There is a central authority empowered to enforce the terms 
of union, to manage trade and financial relations with the outside world, 
to levy some sub-continent wide taxes and to carry out the financial, 
industrial and infrastructure policies characteristic of the moderate 
version of ISI. The moderate version has the features I described in Part 
II, above, including extensive foreign ownership, a mixed colonial and 
post-colonial domestic elite relying on a combination of “traditional” 
and modern property rights, along with military and police, party 
political and raw economic power to keep control of the state. 
Of course, it is hard to imagine how a pan-African federal state could 
possibly have come into existence, and even conceding that 
balkanization was a cause of political instability, it is hard to imagine 
that the state could have avoided all kinds of severe internal and external 
stresses. But we don’t have to imagine that every single square mile of 
the sub-continent is included, and we can allow for significant resources 
devoted to maintaining order, through military rule, civilian strongman 
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authoritarianism, or some system of power sharing through political 
parties. 
At its creation, in let’s say 1965, the state would have had a maximum 
possible area of approximately 23,650,000 square kilometers, compared 
to 9,327,450 for China and 2,973,190 for India.23 It would have had a 
relatively sparse population of approximately 260 million, compared to 
715 million for China and 487 million for India, on their much smaller 
territories, and GDP (constant 2000 U.S. dollars) of approximately $488 
per capita, compared to $100 for China, and $193 for India in that year.24 
The (comparatively) high African GDP per capita reflects the settler- 
and foreign-owned mining economies of the subcontinent at 
independence, and also the relative prosperity of small farmers 
producing cash crops for export. Of course these statistics are only 
suggestive, given their radical imprecision, both conceptually and 
empirically. 
1.  The Federal Mega-State Might Well Have Outperformed 
Balkanized Africa During the ISI Period 
The government of the federal state would have been a large entity, 
but because it would not have had to waste a very large proportion of the 
post-independence educated cadres on the duplication of state structures, 
it might well have been more effective than any of the actual successor 
states. It would not have faced the “challenges” implicit in division into 
“coastal resource-poor,” “landlocked resource-poor,” and “resource 
rich” (oil cursed) states. The federal government would have been able 
to raise revenue in one place and spend it in another, and to encourage 
the movement of complementary resources into conjunction across sub-
national boundaries. The state would have had a diverse set of 
agricultural and mineral exports, and therefore a more stable source of 
foreign exchange, than the four dozen balkanized states, often practicing 
export monoculture and with a single natural resource, have been able to 
attain. 
                                                     
23. WORLD BANK, WORLD DATABANK: WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS (WDI) & GLOBAL 
DEVELOPMENT FINANCE (GDF), http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do (follow the “Select 
Variables” tab; select “China” and “India”; follow the “Next>>” button; select “Land area (sq. 
km)”; follow the “Next>>” button; select “1965”; follow the “Next>>” button; then choose 
reporting format to view data for each country) (last visited Feb. 24, 2012). 
24. Id. (follow “Select Variables” tab; select “China” and “India”; follow the “Next>>” button; 
select “GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$)” and “Population, total”; follow “Next>>” button; 
select “1965”; follow “Next>>” button; then choose reporting format to view data for each country) 
(last visited Feb. 24, 2012). 
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It would no longer be the case that a large part of the African 
population lived in states far too small to provide viable internal markets 
for an import substitution strategy. The combination of a continental 
internal market with political stability might have made the federal state 
more attractive to world capital markets, both for credit and for FDI, 
than was Africa under actual conditions. This would apply both to 
investment in the protected ISI infant industries and in the extraction of 
natural resources, to the extent the federal state followed say, Brazil and 
the Ivory Coast, friendly to FDI, rather than the more nationalist 
variants. Africa would have probably gotten back a considerably larger 
share of its surplus than under the actual regime. It is possible, though 
not certain, that political stability would have induced political power 
holders to pay more attention to long-term projects for growth, rather 
than to extracting as much as they could, by any means available, in the 
expectation that their chances for enrichment would be short-lived.25 
2.  The Mega-State’s Perverse Political Economy Would Likely Have 
Had Many Disastrous Effects 
However, many of the factors that have precluded take-off oriented 
investment in real life Africa would have existed in the imaginary 
federal state. A vast array of assets would still have been owned by 
multinationals, trading companies, and ethnically Arab or Indian 
merchants and moneylenders, and foreign creditors would still have been 
in a position to strongly influence policy because of the dependence of 
the government on a continuous flow of credit. Surpluses would still 
have been controlled by foreign creditors and multinationals, the 
domestic elites would still have appropriated a massive share, shipped it 
abroad or spent it on servants and villas. They would have had the same 
need to exploit the countryside and buy off the urban masses and so 
forth. 
The tendency of ISI regimes to run trade and budget deficits, leading 
to periodic currency crises, vulnerability to speculative attacks and 
dependence on the IFIs, was aggravated by the instability of prices in 
world commodity markets for their primary product exports. But the 
tendency to balance of payments crises was also caused by the 
willingness of ruling groups to overvalue the currency, raising the price 
of exports while making imports nominally cheap, and then to impose 
massive quantitative restrictions on imports but with widespread 
exceptions and evasions. 
                                                     
25. See BATES, supra note 5, at 26–27. 
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Budgets deficits like trade deficits had appeal in part because of the 
always-threatening instability of the politics of post-independence 
Africa. Whoever was in power had to thread their way between the 
“traditional” tribal elites, the new African property holders, the military 
and police forces, the urban masses, the multinationals, banks and IFI’s, 
and Western governments always conditioning the aid (essential to 
grease these wheels) on avoiding any economic policy that looked even 
vaguely “red.” 
These problems would have existed in the federal state as well. And 
as in balkanized Africa, the federal state might have solved them through 
authoritarian one-man rule. But stability of this kind (think of Mobutu) 
would not likely have staunched the drain of social surplus in every 
direction except into large-scale effective growth-inducing and poverty-
reducing investment. 
For me, a key point here is that in dealing with a continental federal 
state pursuing ISI, the dominant ex-colonial powers, very much 
including the United States, would in all likelihood have worked even 
harder to reward cooperation with Western economic interests and to 
punish ruthlessly any kind of experiment in the direction of “de-linking,” 
expropriation, or “redistribution.” As happened in the real world, the 
Western powers and the multinationals would have allied with the 
domestic elites, offering them some guarantees against an uprising from 
below and access to personal riches, at the price of policy subservience, 
and a wide variety of public and private corruptions. I think a continental 
state might have done a good bit better than the balkanized states in the 
ISI stage up to 1980, but unlikely that there would have been anything 
comparable to the (costly) accomplishments of China, or for that matter 
of India. 
As for the stage of liberalization, the federal state pursuing the 
policies of the neoliberal IFIs would have opened its economy by freeing 
the currency, eliminating controls on capital movement, reducing or 
eliminating both tariffs and export subsidies, dismantling its public and 
parastatal enterprises, and allowing the ISI protected industries to fail if 
they could not compete with imports from say, China, Iran, Brazil or 
Bangladesh. It would have shrunk the state sector to a remnant of its 
former self, and made provision of water, education and health 
conditional on user fees. Rule-of-law programs financed by aid would 
have built new courtrooms and computerized them, in a probably vain 
effort to increase “access to justice” defined as access to the rule 
structure left over from the colonial period. 
Whereas it seems quite possible that ISI in a continental federal non-
communist state would have performed better than did African states in 
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balkanized reality, it does not seem plausible, at least to me, that the 
imaginary federal neoliberal program would have outperformed the real 
world African version. True, the oil and mining companies negotiating 
with a continental state would have had less bargaining power, but they 
would still have had full Western support for their outrageous contracts 
and enforcement through bilateral investment treaties. All the leakages 
abroad would have increased exponentially as the structure of ISI 
controls was relaxed, just as happened in real life Africa. 
B.  Economic Development Under an Imaginary African Communist 
Mega-State 
Given this assessment of the effects of balkanization, the remaining 
question is whether there was an alternative political economy that might 
have produced better results for Africa than did the one actually adopted 
under the conditions of balkanization. The main extant model of an 
alternative political economy that produced take-off is that of China, 
with the Indian and Brazilian models being currently contenders for a 
similar status. For reasons of space and competence, I am going to 
construct my second thought experiment using China, with some Indian 
comparisons, leaving Brazil out altogether. 
The exercise suggests that a sub-Saharan African communist mega-
state might have performed far better than the actual African states did, 
and also far better than did the hypothetical federal state pursuing the 
moderate non-communist version of ISI. And this in turn suggests that 
policy failure was a much more important cause of slow growth and the 
persistence of extreme poverty than was balkanization. 
1.  A Sub-Continental African Communist Mega-State as a Thought 
Experiment 
To begin with the outcomes in real life, for the period between 1965 
and 2010, sub-Saharan Africa compares as follows to China and India 
(with massive reservations as to accuracy): 
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TABLE 126 
 1965 2010 
Africa GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$) 488 640 
India GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$) 193 823 
China GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$) 100 2425 
Africa population 260,000,000 854,951,000 
India population 487,324,000 1,170,938,000 
China Population 715,185,000 1,338,299,512 
 
Imagine that in the early 1960s, at the time of African independence, 
a communist political movement had managed to consolidate all the ex-
colonies of sub-Saharan Africa into a single state (including South 
Africa, Southern Rhodesia, Angola, Mozambique, and Portuguese 
Guinea), and then to maintain power up to today. Imagine that such a 
state had modeled itself after China, perhaps omitting the stage of the 
Cultural Revolution (over by 1971). It would have begun with the 
ruthless suppression of political opposition, including breaking of the 
power of tribal political institutions. The mega-state would have 
maintained domestic order over the whole sub-continent by a 
combination of secret police and brutal military interventions. 
That state, while very poor by any standard, would have had, by 
virtue of its sheer size, its control of relevant assets, and its political 
ability to force savings, very large resources in absolute terms, and 
would not have devoted money and very scarce Western educated 
manpower to duplicative state structures. By virtue of its centralized 
dictatorial governmental power it could have deployed those resources, 
for good or ill, in aggressive and far-reaching development programs, 
without reliance on the foreign aid that is the sole key to development in 
the poverty-trap model. These policies might, just possibly, have 
eventually produced the kind of self-sustaining transformative 
development process that has occurred in China. 
The consolidated communist state would have pursued a strategy of 
centrally planned industrialization, collectivization and mechanization of 
agriculture (including electrification and irrigation projects), and state 
development of oil and mineral resources. The Western powers might 
well have boycotted African mega-state exports of agricultural products 
                                                     
26. WORLD BANK, supra note 23 (follow “Select Variables” tab; select “China” and “India”; 
follow “Next>>” button; select “GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$)” and “Population, total”; 
follow “Next>>” button; select “1965” and “2010”; follow “Next>>” button; then choose reporting 
format to view data for each country) (last visited Feb. 24, 2012). 
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and natural resources,27 in which case they would have gone to the 
Soviet bloc and China, from which the African communist mega-state 
would have imported industrial equipment and low-quality consumer 
goods. Population control would have been a major policy, through 
something like the Chinese “one child” policy, adapted to the African 
circumstances. All of this would have involved a lot of deadly violence 
and oppression of all kinds. 
If we imagine this counterfactual in 1990, the year after the fall of the 
Berlin Wall and twelve years after the beginning of the Chinese turn to 
markets in 1978, I think most interested observers asked to speculate 
would have said that the vast human sacrifices that a post-1960 pan-
African communist state would have exacted would have produced little 
or no economic progress, with little or no prospects for the future. 
A first reason would be that as of 1990 it was by no means clear that 
China was approaching take-off. It was considerably more plausible that 
the state-led, centrally planned and collectivist phase of Chinese policy 
had been an unmitigated disaster from the point of view of development, 
setting the country back perhaps by decades. It would have seemed 
unlikely to say the least that my imaginary African version of the 
Chinese revolution could have a positive outcome. The Indian 
liberalizing turn was still a year in the future. 
This analysis of “what would have happened” under the counter-
factual would have been reinforced by the experiences of Tanzania 
under Nyerere; Ghana under Nkrumah; Guinea under Sékou Touré; and 
by Ethiopia, the Sudan, and Congo-Brazzaville under their hard Marxist 
versions of ISI. As of 1990, these African versions of “radical” ISI, 
whether or not they were significantly influenced by the Chinese model, 
were clearly closer to it than the moderate versions. There may have 
been many and diverse reasons for their failure, including that they drew 
the intense hostility of the Western Cold War powers, but the fact 
remained that each seemed to have led to spiraling economic 
                                                     
27. Why is there no communist African state? Because the Western powers, as an important part 
of their Cold War strategy, did everything they could to prevent the emergence of anything that 
looked even a little like a communist regime in the Global South, and to overthrow or strangle the 
few that managed to come to power nonetheless. The United States has played a role: the 
assassination of Lumumba and installation of Mobutu, backing the pro-Western tribal groupings in 
Angola; backing first one side then the other in the Ethiopia/Somalia conflict; tolerating apartheid; 
working to isolate Nkrumah and Nyerere. At the same time, the British and French, and their 
multinationals, have been continuously active—as much by buying out potential radical left leaders 
as by suppressing them directly. A second reason, no less important, is that the African states that 
directly emulated either a Russian or a Chinese model did extraordinarily badly in the period 
leading up to the neoliberal turn of 1980 followed by the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989. 
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dysfunction, and eventually to negative growth. 
In that atmosphere, and a year after the fall of the Berlin Wall, 
looking for a thought experiment to assess the causes of slow African 
growth, it might have seemed plausible to ask, “What would have 
happened to African growth if there had never been an ISI and the sub-
continent had pursued a strong free market policy, with a small state, no 
regulation, and open economies?”28 
In 1990, the neoliberal radical turn to the market and away from the 
state had just passed its peak, as the disastrous results for Africa in the 
1980s were becoming obvious. It might have been conceded in 1990 that 
the results of the radical neoliberal turn of the International Monetary 
Fund and the World Bank (the IFIs) after the crises and political changes 
of 1980 had been particularly disappointing in sub-Saharan Africa. But 
the conclusion would have likely been that this merely made a case for a 
partial return to the pre-1980 policies, or perhaps for a turn to 
institutional development focused on the rule of law and human capital, 
both feasible only with substantial foreign aid and aid-funded foreign 
expertise. 
Is that reading of “what might have been” still plausible today? Let us 
continue with our thought experiment. Imagine that after massive forced 
saving (derived mainly but not only from agricultural and mining 
exports) invested in industry, agriculture, resource extraction and 
infrastructure, much of it wasted, inefficient, or bureaucratically 
mismanaged, the mega-state made a turn to the market, perhaps 
somewhat later than in China itself. In this turn, export-led growth, 
perhaps with more emphasis on oil and mineral and agricultural exports 
and (just a little) less on manufactured goods, supported by strict control 
of consumer goods imports, the exchange rate, and foreign direct 
investment, and under strong “steering” by state economists, might or 
                                                     
28. Even today, an important study of African development can assert that a major cause of the 
lag in African growth by comparison with the rest of the developing world is the “state control 
syndrome,” supposedly inspired by “socialism” and defined to include all the characteristic policies 
of moderate ISI, from marketing boards to development banks to restrictions on capital flows. For 
this view, the interesting counterfactual is not a Chinese style communist regime, but an equally 
imaginary “syndrome free” or completely “free market” Africa. See THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
ECONOMIC GROWTH IN AFRICA, 1960–2000, supra note 4, at 137–201. It is interesting that chapter 
nine of this study, by Benno Ndulu, The evolution of global development paradigms and their 
influence on African economic growth, seems to concede that it cannot be simply “controls” in the 
abstract, contrasted with an equally abstract idea of an idealized “free market,” that explains slow 
growth. Id. at 315–47. But by setting up their study in that way, the authors seem to be saying that 
“controls” per se, regardless of their content or the mode of their administration, are the problem. 
That contention seems to me to have been decisively refuted well before the publication of the study 
by take-off in China, India, and Brazil. 
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might not have led to rapid growth in GNP and GNP per capita, and 
mal-distributed but dramatic reduction of extreme poverty. 
Sometime around now, in the more favorable scenario, the entrenched 
political/economic/dynastic elite governing the mega-state would be 
reckoning with the various environmental disasters, from desertification 
to industrial pollution, generated by its development policies, while 
toying with preemptive cosmetic democratization moves. The Western 
core economic powers would be demanding trade opening as the price of 
belated membership in the WTO. 
In the less favorable scenario—but still imagining that the mega-state 
neither disintegrated nor became an exploited Chinese or Russian 
“vassal state”—there would have been slow growth, little poverty 
reduction, a boom for Swiss banks, and several million victims of 
political violence. There might also have been significant communist-
style educational and public health advances, and infrastructure 
construction, supposing that the less successful version of the regime 
could still do some things right. Of course, the real word outcomes for 
African countries were less than uniformly positive as well. When 
thinking about the genuine horrors that communist regimes perpetrated 
on their peoples, it is good to keep in mind that much less organized 
African violence has also been horrific. 
From a database of casualties in political conflicts around the world, I 
added up the figures for sub-Saharan African wars, civil wars and 
internal repressions, between 1965 and 2010, that caused more than 
100,000 estimated deaths (not counting wars of independence). The total 
came to 6,550,000.29 The accepted but very possibly low estimated 
                                                     
29. The data below are from Monty G. Marshall, Major Episodes of Political Violence: 1946–
2011, CTR. FOR SYSTEMIC PEACE, http://www.systemicpeace.org/warlist.htm (last updated Dec. 6, 
2011). 
I have included all conflicts with more than 100,000 casualties between 1965 and 2010, along 
with statistics for the civil wars in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Congo–Brazzaville. There were 
another dozen conflicts with tens of thousands of estimated deaths. Just the conflicts with more than 
100,000 casualties add to a total of 7,450,000 dead. Of course these statistics, as the source insists, 
are highly conjectural, and give no more than an order of magnitude. 
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violent death toll in the Chinese Cultural Revolution, 1966–71, is 
500,000. 
Famine deaths between 1965 and 2000 for which mortality estimates 
are available look something like this30 (with the usual strong caveats). 
The deaths from famine during the Great Leap Forward, 1958–62, are 
estimated at eighteen to thirty-three million, but after that, the 2000 
study finds no famines in China. In 1972–73, 130,000 died of famine in 
the state of Maharashta, India. That seems to be the full story for those 
two countries. I added up the numbers from thirteen African famines 
between 1965 and 2000, in Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia, Uganda, Nigeria, 
and Mozambique, and got a figure of between 2,900,000 and 3,900,000 
deaths. Of course, there have been many famine deaths in Africa since 
2000. 
                                                     
TABLE 2 
Year(s) State(s) Involved Brief Description of Conflict Deaths 
1966 Nigeria Ethnic war (Biafra) 200,000 
1971–78 Uganda Ethnic war (Idi Amin regime) 250,000 
1974–91 Ethiopia Ethnic war (Eritreans and others) 750,000 
1975–
2002 
Angola Civil war 1,000,000 
1981–86 Uganda Repression 100,000 
1981–92 Mozambique Civil war 500,000 
1983–
2002 
Sudan North/South 1,000,000 
1988–
2011 
Somalia Civil war 100,000 
1990–97 Liberia Civil war 40,000 
1991–
2001 
Sierra Leone Civil war 25,000 
1993–
2005 
Burundi Ethnic war (Tutsi/Hutu) 100,000 
1994 Rwanda Ethnic war (Tutsi/Hutu) 500,000 
1996–
2011 
Dem. Rep. Congo Civil wars 2,500,000 
1997–99 Congo–Brazzaville Civil wars 10,000 
1998–
2000 
Ethiopia/Eritrea Interstate war 100,000 
2001–04 Nigeria Communal 55,000 
2003–11 Sudan Civil war 350,000 
 
30. Stephen Devereux, Famine in the Twentieth Century 6 (Inst. of Dev. Studies, Working Paper 
No. 105, 2000), available at http://www.ids.ac.uk/go/idspublication/famine-in-the-twentieth-
century. 
10 - WLR March 2012 - Kennedy.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/15/2012  12:10 PM 
2012] AFRICAN POVERTY 231 
 
As for extreme poverty, here are the approximations for the period 
1981–2005 (keep in mind that estimated GDP per capital for India for 
the year 1965 was $193): 
 
TABLE 3: PERCENTAGE OF PEOPLE LIVING BELOW $1.25 A DAY31 
Region 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 
China 84.0 69.4 54.0 60.2 53.7 36.4 35.6 28.4 15.9 




53.7 56.2 54.8 57.9 57.1 58.7 58.2 55.1 50.9 
 
These statistics do not in any way prove that Africa would have 
suffered fewer violent deaths and famines, or have fewer people living in 
extreme poverty, if something like a Chinese style revolution had 
occurred. But they do indicate that the cost of the actual course of events 
was high, higher in these very crude terms than the post-1970 costs to 
China and India of pursuing their models. And they give a sense that 
even if a revolutionary course had been followed and failed, the failed 
result might not have been much worse than what actually occurred. 
2. The Political Economy of an African Communist Mega-State 
The imaginary African mega-state began with significant assets. 
South Africa, Northern Rhodesia, the Congo, soon Nigeria and 
Portuguese Guinea, all had massive natural resources, and, for the two 
southern states, colonial era direct foreign investment. Today, sub-
Saharan Africa counts as comparatively natural-resource rich compared 
to China (or India). The mega-state would have had sufficient resources 
to sustain numerous and ambitious development projects, even in the 
likely event of a boycott by the Western great powers. China (and the 
Asian Tigers as well), achieved striking growth and equally striking 
poverty reduction without either a lot of aid or a lot of direct foreign 
investment. 
The Chinese policy path began with a commitment to state-controlled 
development, within the general parameters of ISI, with of course the 
dramatic episodes of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural 
                                                     
31. Shaohua Chen & Martin Ravallion, The Developing World Is Poorer than We Thought, But 
No Less Successful in the Fight Against Poverty 42 (The World Bank Dev. Research Grp., Policy 
Research Working Paper No. 4703, 2008), available at http://www.worldbank.org/reference/ 
(follow “Documents and Reports” hyperlink; then search “Documents & Reports” for “WPS4703”). 
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Revolution. The mega-state, I imagine, gets started after these have 
played themselves out, and tries nothing similar. The second stage, after 
1978, combined liberalization—the competition between capitalist 
entrepreneurs and farmers driving development—with very strong 
residual state powers of intervention. The state managed the overall 
strategy of export-led growth by manipulating incentives, particularly 
credit, trade and currency policy (somewhat like the model described for 
the Tigers by Amsden32). 
The communist mega-state’s development strategy would have been 
based on a specific set of normative/institutional/legal premises, not 
adequately summarized by the typical Western cliché that “under 
communism everything belongs to the state and the economy is centrally 
planned.” 
First, the mega-state would have expropriated all foreign property, 
including all natural resources, agricultural plantations, and real estate 
and commercial assets, and expelled the banks and trading companies 
that in real life stayed on after the British and French officials had left. It 
would have run its new properties through a system of administrative 
delegation, within which the managers of enterprises operated with 
significant discretion under supervision by the Communist Party’s 
shadow network, within the rigid larger framework imposed from the 
center. Second, it would have adopted a policy of tight control vis-à-vis 
the world market, perhaps something close to closure in the event of a 
Western economic boycott (except for state controlled barter within the 
communist economic bloc). 
Third, it would not have respected the private property of local pre-
revolutionary groups, whether modernized or traditional, either in 
designing programs or in deciding what to do with the surpluses they 
generate, except so far as that would have seemed necessary, in the 
second phase, to keep the post-liberalization bourgeoisie on board. 
Finally, after the market turn, the mega-state, imitating China (and not 
India), would have kept control of the liberalized economy, by refusing 
the political/economic moves that would make the newly enriched 
capitalist class sufficiently autonomous and sufficiently powerful to be 
able to control the course of policy in its own interests. This is a crucial 
part of the thought experiment, guaranteeing that the elite continues to 
see its class interests identified with the national whole, rather than with 
the profitability of business, regardless of social consequences. 
To put it bluntly, the imaginary communist mega-state would neither 
                                                     
32. AMSDEN, supra note 3. 
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have permitted the massive expatriation of surplus nor have spent more 
than a relatively small part of what it controlled non-productively. 
Surplus would have gone (still in this best case scenario) to human 
capital, infrastructure, industrialization, the mechanization of agriculture, 
natural resource extraction and technological innovation, all under 
intense supervision, even after the supervisors had taken a giant step 
back to empower the multitude of partially liberalized new actors. As 
I’ve already insisted, they might very well have wasted what they 
controlled, or succumbed to the no less serious risks of communist 
corruption and stupidity, but if all went well, we might have a 
completely different idea than the one we have of what it means to be 
African. 
3.  Of Course a Thought Experiment Proves Nothing 
Because our development theory is so weak, when we imagine an 
African mega-state that has the means for and the objective of rapid 
development, we still have no confidence in predicting what would 
happen. We know the model worked for China. But because we have no 
theory, it is possible or even likely that aspects of the imagined African 
situation that differ from the Chinese situation would mean a completely 
different outcome. 
The Chinese communist political and economic development model 
may seem implausible, even as a thought experiment, because, for 
example, China has a relatively culturally homogeneous population, has 
been politically unified for millenia, has a long tradition of centralized 
bureaucratic control, and was colonized only partially and briefly by 
Japan (plus the treaty ports), all by contrast with sub-Saharan Africa. 
Perhaps we can do the experiment more plausibly with India. India was 
thoroughly colonized for a century and a half, has a culturally and 
ethnically heterogeneous population that was largely illiterate at 
independence, and has nothing like the Chinese traditions of continuous 
centralization and bureaucracy. 
The African communist mega-state might have adopted, without 
relinquishing its dictatorial powers, some aspects of the more 
decentralized, Indian, mixed public/private version of ISI. The flight of 
British capital allowed the national bourgeoisie to acquire the foreign 
assets without expropriation. The Indian state created and favored state 
enterprises but also supported domestic entrepreneurship and capital 
formation within a heavily regulated, although often ineffective, planned 
economy (often inaccurately characterized as “socialist”), up to the 
dramatic moment of liberalization in 1991. In the Indian case, there was 
much more rule of law than in the Chinese case. The Indian 
10 - WLR March 2012 - Kennedy.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/15/2012  12:10 PM 
234 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87:205 
 
Constitutional Court gave some protection to industrialists but not 
landlords, consistent with the mixed economy model. Although the 
Indian elites pursued these policies in a democratic context, the 
hypothetical African mega-state would not have had to adopt that aspect 
in order to benefit (or not) from the economic paradigm. 
It is easy enough to find differences between Africa and India that 
might reduce the relevance of the Indian model: perhaps the late 
“opening” of Africa, by comparison with India (reversing the usual 
argument that a colonial past stifles development), or the role of Hindu 
and Islamic commercial civilizations as unifying as well as divisive 
factors, by contrast with the stunning plurality of non-commercial 
African cultures. Perhaps more important than any of the above for a 
hypothetical mega-state would have been the lack of pre-World War II 
manufacturing experience, by contrast with India (as well as with China, 
Japan, and Korea).33 All of these factors might have militated against 
African mega-state success. But they might not have, or might have been 
overcome, for example by massive expertise and technology transfer 
from China. If it is right as I argued that we have no plausible theory of 
take-off, uncertainty about the causes of development is now to be a 
permanent aspect of our situation, and that includes uncertainty about 
the causes of African extreme poverty. 
My belief that the communist mega-state would have done better than 
the non-communist federal state is no more than a hunch, obviously 
influenced by my background ideological commitments. I would say the 
same about the liberal/neoliberal contrary intuition.34 My larger point is 
a simple one: if China, India, and Brazil have managed to “take off” into 
self-sustaining, transformative economic growth, perhaps the mega-state 
could have done the same. If there is a poverty trap today for most 
African states, the choice of a weak version of ISI followed by a strong 
version of Washington Consensus liberalization, all in the context of 
balkanization, is an important part of the explanation. 
CONCLUSION 
This paper is a critique of the poverty trap understanding of African 
poverty. I think this understanding underestimates the significance of 
balkanization. But more importantly, it also underestimates the 
significance of anti-developmental resource allocation caused by the 
way typical African political economies distribute income among 
                                                     
33. Id. at 121. 
34. See supra note 27. 
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competing economic interests. The Western powers are chiefly 
responsible for balkanization. Western public and private powers are 
chiefly responsible for the post-independence policies of non-communist 
African countries, and for the perverse political economy that has 
typically resulted. This reinterpretation puts considerably more of the 
blame for African poverty on them than does the poverty trap way of 
thinking about it, without in any way exonerating the African elites that 
benefited from choosing this path. Let me close by saying what should 
have been obvious: Western responsibility is not an argument that it 
would have been better for Africa to have had a continental Chinese 
revolution with all the suffering that would have entailed. If there is a 
normative cast to the argument, it is that the Western powers should 
have used their utterly disproportionate power not to support the 
compromised regimes that emerged post-independence, but a much 
more radical, popular mobilization-based version of ISI followed by 
tightly controlled, centrally guided liberalization. Of course nothing 
guarantees that this would have succeeded any better than did the actual 
policy. 
 
